

VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF

Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP80R01720R00060029-4
Approved For The Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 25 June 1970


TO: The Director

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Attached is a short note for the record
on my 22 June session with Packard.



George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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22 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 22 June 1970 Meeting with Acting Secretary Packard

1. On Monday, 22 June 1970, I met with Mr. David Packard, who, in Secretary Laird's absence was serving as Acting Secretary of Defense. General Pursley attended this session. We covered developments of the past week in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. I gave the Acting Secretary a copy of the April 1970 hamlet attacks map and the VC combat hamlets map prepared by [redacted]

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2. The only major substantive points that arose related to Laos operations. I told the Acting Secretary that [redacted] was going very well and apprised him of our intention to apply the [redacted] technique. He expressed considerable interest and approbation and asked to be kept advised of our plans as they materialized. I also made it clear that in responding to his note to the Director on levels of air support for North Laos operations, we would table what we felt the minimum amount of support absolutely necessary if we were to discharge the task the President had levied upon us. From our parochial standpoint, this absolute number was of more concern than proportionate cuts in overall sortie levels in the theater. Packard said this was a perfectly understandable approach from our point of view. He assured me that the Defense Department was trying to adjust the mix of available assets to minimize the adverse impact of absolute cuts in overall sortie levels. He well understood that for our purposes gunships and A-1-Es were much more useful than F-4s, let alone F-111s. Unfortunately, the Air Force was almost exclusively interested in sophisticated hardware of the latter type, but that was his problem -- not ours.

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[redacted]
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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DCI/SAVA/GACarver:taw:22June70

Orig. - Director (Returned & filed GAC Chrono)

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